Creditors\u27 Rights and Security Transactions -- 1956 Tennessee Survey by Hartman, Paul J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 9 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - August 1956 Article 8 
8-1956 
Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions -- 1956 Tennessee 
Survey 
Paul J. Hartman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul J. Hartman, Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions -- 1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 965 (1956) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol9/iss5/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 




Possession of Land Under Contract of Sale as Notice to Subsequent
Purchaser of the Land: There is a security transaction facet in the
ejectment case of Harris v. Buchignani,' decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, which should be given some attention. In that case,
by clear implication, the court put forth some disturbing doctrine
relative to priorities under the Tennessee recording statute. Without
specifically mentioning it, the court appears to have disavowed and
repudiated the doctrine that possession of property inconsistent with
the record title holder is notice to a subsequent deed of trust lender
so as to prevent the lender from qualifying as a bona fide purchaser
from the makers of the deed of trust. In Tennessee a deed of trust
lender is a purchaser and not a creditor, within the purview of the
recording statutes of Tennessee.
2
In the Harris case, Simms and wife, the owners of certain real estate,
executed a contract of sale of that real estate to the defendants in this
ejectment suit, Martha Harris and her husband. This .contract was
executed in 1925 but was not recorded. However, the Harris' took
possession of the property and occupied it continuously until ousted
by the present suit. In 1926, Simms and wife (the owners of the same
real estate) executed a deed of trust to the Union Planters Bank &
Trust Company as trustee to secure the payment of an indebtedness.
This deed of trust was promptly recorded. In 1928, Simms and wife
(the owners of the same real estate) executed a warranty deed to
Martha Harris, which was duly recorded. Presumably, this deed was
executed pursuant to the contract of sale which the Simms' made to
the Harris' in 1925. This deed was duly recorded. In 1929, the' Trust
Company foreclosed its 1926 deed of trust on the property in question,
and a trustee's deed was executed to Moore and Buchignani. Sub-
sequently, Moore executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest
in the subject property to Buchignani, the plaintiff. This deed, too, was
duly recorded.
The present case is an ejectment suit by the plaintiff, Buchignani,
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 285 S.W.2d 108 (1955). An earlier round of this protracted litigation is
the subject of comment in Trautman & Kirby, Real Property-1954 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1954).
2. Savings, Building & Loan Ass'n v. McLain, 18 Tenn. App. 292, 76 S.W.2d
650 (E.S. 1934).
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against Martha Harris, who was an equitable owner under an un-
recorded contract of sale made in 1925 and a holder of the legal title
under her recorded deed in 1928, and who continued to occupy the
'premises Tomn the date of her contract of sale in 1925 until ejected
by the present suit. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. It held that the recorded trustee's deed under
the foreclosure of the recorded deed of trust, which was executed and
recorded subsequent to the unrecorded contract of sale from Simms to
Harris, and which deed of trust was recorded prior to the recording
of the warranty deed to the purchaser under the contract of sale
(Simms to Harris), conveyed good title to the grantee under the
trustee's deed. Nothing was said by the court about the effect on
plaintiff's title of the possession of the land by the Harris' during the
entire period, including the time when the deed of trust was executed
and foreclosed. Specifically, nothing is said by the court about the
effect on the deed of trust, which is the immediate source of plain-
tiff's title, of the defendant's possession under contract to purchase
when the deed of trust was executed.
The Tennessee recording statute provides that instruments, such as
the contract here involved, must "be acknowledged and registered" or
they will be "null and void as to existing or subsequent creditors
of, or bona fide purchasers from, the makers without notice. '3 True,
defendant's (Harris) contract of sale was not recorded until after
the execution and recordation of the deed of trust. However, it is most
significant to note that an unrecorded instrument is null and void
only as to "subsequent creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from,
the makers without notice." As previously pointed out, a lender under
a deed of trust in Tennessee is in the category of "purchaser," rather
than that of "creditor"; 4 hence the lender must fall in the category
of a bona fide purchaser without notice; otherwise he is not protected
by the Tennessee recording statute. In short, under the Tennessee
statute unless the lender under a deed of trust can qualify as a "bona
fide purchaser . . .without notice," a prior unrecorded instrument
is not void as to him. Moreover, Tennessee case law leaves no doubt
that a contract or agreement to convey (contract between Simms and
Harris) is such an interest as will prevail as against a subsequent pur-
chaser with notice.5 Hence, under previous Tennessee decisions, plain-
tiff's title depends upon whether or not he had notice of the defend-
ant's contract of sale with Simms in 1925. The Tennessee case law
makes it abundantly clear that notice of a prior interest, which will
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2603, 64-2604 (1956).
4. See note 2 supra.




be effective to charge a subsequent purchaser with knowledge of its
existence, may be either direct information of the prior right or it
may consist of information or facts from which actual knowledge may
be inferred.6 By the overwhelming weight of authority, including
Tennessee, possession of a person not the record owner is a large
source of inquiry notice, and a purchaser takes the land subject to any
rights of the occupier that might be disclosed by a reasonable inquiry.7
Not only had the defendant been in possession of the property for
six months before the deed of trust was executed, but during 17 years
of her possession she was protected by an injunction enjoining the
present plaintiff and others from taking any action to dispossess her
or eject her from the property.
Knowledge of defendant's interest in the property, under her con-
tract to purchase, was imputable to the lender under the deed of
trust and to the subsequent purchasers under the foreclosure of the
deed of trust by virtue of the inquiry notice through defendant's
possession; hence, plaintiff's claim to title should accordingly yield.
8
TRUST RECEIPTS
Right of Finance Company to Repossess Automobile as Against Pur-
chasers from Dealer: Since the last issue of the Tennessee Survey, the
courts in Tennessee have had occasion to consider various facets of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, adopted in Tennessee9 and thirty other
states.10
The "trust receipt" as a financing device had its birth in the im-
porting business." For more than half a century Eastern importers
have been financing their imports by this device. As worked out at
common law the gist of the transaction was that the foreign seller
would draw on the importer's banker for the price, attaching order
bills of lading covering the merchandise to the draft. The importer's
banker would meet the drafts and take title to the bills of lading for
security. The banker would then surrender possession of the bills of
6. Ibid.
7. Possession of a grantee under his unregistered deed is notice of his right,
and such title of the prior grantee under such circumstances is the better
title. Davis v. Cross, 82 Tenn. 637 (1885). See Nikas v. United Constr. Co.,
34 Tenn. App. 435, 447-48, 239 S.W.2d 41, 46 (W.S. 1950). See 4 AMEICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.12 (Casner ed. 1952) for almost a full page of case
citations from many of the states, supporting this proposition.
8. Williams v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 31 Tenn. App. 128, 138, 212
S.W.2d 897, 901-02 (E.S. 1948).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1001 to -1019 (1956).
10. See 9A U.L.A. 171 (Supp. 1955) for a list of states having adopted this
Act.
11. These general introductory remarks about the "trust receipt" and the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act are based primarily on the commissioners'
prefatory note to that Act. 9A U.L.A. 274 (1951). For a discussion of the trust
receipt in Tennessee, see Comment, 22 TENN. L. Ray. 392, 393 (1952).
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lading for some necessary limited purpose such as reshipping or re-
storing the goods, or to process the goods (roasting coffee, tanning
hides, throwing silk). On receiving the bills of lading, the importer
would sign a trust receipt, acknowledging that title still remained in
the banker, and agreeing to whatever limitation was imposed on the
importer's ability to deal with the goods in question.
With the increasing importance of the automobile industry, the
finance companies and banks who financed the purchase of automobiles
by dealers from manufacturers turned to the trust receipt device to
maintain security in the cars in order to cover their advance of the
price. At first the courts sustained the validity of this security device,
although it was unrecorded. More and more, however, the courts
have tended definitely to deny validity of the unrecorded trust receipt
as against bona fide purchasers from the dealer, as well as against his
creditors. The net result, after much study, was the proposed Uniform
Trust Receipts Act; which regulates and validates the trust receipt as
a security device when filing requirements are satisfied.
The only recording required by this Act is that of filing with the
Secretary of State 2 a statement signed by lender and borrower,
giving their addresses, to the effect that they intend to do business
on the trust receipt plan with regard to a particular type of goods.
There is no filing of the individual trust receipt executed by the finance
company and the automobile dealer.
The Act defines the rights and duties of: (1) the financier (en-
truster); (2) the dealer (trustee); (3) purchasers (including pledgees,
mortgagees and transferees in bulk) from the dealer or trustee; (4)
creditors (lien creditors and general creditors) of the dealer or trustee.
In Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.13 the Tennessee
Court of Appeals had to wrestle with a complex and troublesome ques-
tion of the rights of an alleged purchaser of an automobile from a
dealer who held the automobile under a trust receipt. The purchase
of automobiles by the dealer from the manufacturer was financed
by General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) which took the
dealer's notes and trust receipts, stating that dealer held the automo-
biles in trust with title remaining in GMAC until the notes were paid.
GMAC allowed the dealer to place the automobiles in his salesroom
and empowered him to sell them. GMAC replevied one of the
automobiles from the dealer, because he had defaulted in his pay-
ments. The instant case is a replevin suit against GMAC by an alleged
purchaser of this automobile replevied by GMAC. Complainant (pur-
chaser) claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
12. UNIFORM TPTTST RECEIPTS ACT 4 13.
13. 286 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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of GMAC's right to the automobile ("Buyer in the ordinary course
of trade"). As such a purchaser, complainant would take free of
GMAC's rights. The alleged consideration for the purchase by com-
plainant was a supposed prior credit which complainant had with the
dealer, plus complainant's personal check for the balance of the pur-
chase price. Complainant claimed that within an hour or so after
he bought the automobile, he returned it to the dealer to be serviced
and while in dealer's garage GMAC replevied the automobile. By
complainant's own testimony title papers were never delivered to
him by the dealer until after the automobile was repossessed by
GMAC. GMAC denied that complainant was a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of GMAC's right to the automobile, and
further alleged that the so-called sale was a conspiracy between the
dealer and complainant to defeat GMAC's rights.
The chancellor who tried complainant's replevin suit held that he
.had failed to carry the burden of proving that he was a bona fide
purchaser of the automobile without notice of GMAC's rights. After
a thorough analysis of the evidence of the case, the court of appeals
agreed with the chancellor and awarded judgment against complainant
for the value of the automobile in question since complainant had
sold the automobile when he repossessed it at the beginning of this
suit. The court of appeals thought the retention of the automobile by
dealer was fraudulent as to dealer's creditors, and that complainant-
purchaser had not proved that he was a bona fide purchaser without
notice of GMAC's rights.
It would serve no useful purpose to analyse the evidence here. There
are, however, some facets of the law of this case that should be given
a critical examination. The court's conclusion that the retention of the
possession of the automobile by dealer constituted a fraudulent trans-
action as to GMAC is based on section 26 of the Uniform Sales Act.
This section provides, in substance, that where a person having sold
goods continues in possession of the goods, and such retention is frau-
dulent in fact, or is deemed fraudulent under any rule of law, a
creditor of the seller may treat the sale as void.14 In Tennessee a seller's
retention of personal property after a sale is prima facie evidence of
fraud as to another buyer from the seller, and puts on the buyer the
burden of proving the transaction was fair and bona fide.15 This rule,
which makes retention of possession prima facie fraudulent as to
buyers, the court applied in favor of a creditor of the dealer, (GMAC).
The court then concluded that since the retention was fraudulent as
to creditors it could be attacked successfully by GMAC under section
26 of the Uniform Sales Act as a void transaction.
14. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 26; TENN. CODE ANN. . 47-1226 (1956).
15. See cases cited in the instant opinion, 286 S.W.2d at 358.
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Assuming that the court was correct in holding that the retention
of possession by the seller is fraudulent as to creditors of seller, as
distinguished from buyers, nevertheless there is considerable doubt
that GMAC comes within the scope of creditors protected by section
26 of the Uniform Sales Act. Glenn, a leading authority in the field
of fraudulent conveyances, states that the rule of law incorporated
in section 26 of the Uniform Sales Act is based on an estoppel. 16 That
is to say, the retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent be-
cause it misleads a creditor and works an injury to the creditor. The
presently existing creditor may forbear to press his claim against the
seller (his debtor) because he sees no change in possession of the
article. The case of the subsequent creditor is that he extended credit
on the faith of the seller's apparent ownership. As to each class of
creditors, then, a misrepresentation works an injury. It therefore
follows, concludes Glenn, that one who is fully acquainted with the
actual situation from the outset (such as GMAC was) should not be
protected by this section of the Uniform Sales Act branding retention
of possession by the seller of a sold article as a species of fraudulent
conveyance.17 GMAC was not misled by dealer's possession of the
automobile in the case at hand; GMAC had entrusted it to the dealer.
As between the dealer and GMAC, under the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, the trust receipt was valid and enforceable, and as against the
dealer, GMAC was entitled to possession of the goods on default.18
But when GMAC gives dealer the liberty of sale, and a sale is made to
a "buyer in the ordinary course of trade"; then the buyer takes free
of GMAC's security interest in the automobile, and not even the filing
required by the Act will constitute notice of GMAC's security interest
so as to defeat the buyer. 19 On this facet of the case the issue appears
to be whether complainant (buyer) could qualify as a "buyer in the
ordinary course of trade." The Uniform Trust Receipts Act defines
"buyer in the ordinary course of trade" as a "person to whom goods are
sold and delivered for new value and who acts in good faith and with-
out actual knowledge of any limitation on the trustee's (dealer's)
16. 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 344-49 (1940).
The Supreme Court of the United States in construing a Missouri statute
of the same type as section 26 of the Uniform Sales Act said: "The object of
the statute is to prevent parties from being misled by apparent ownership of
property where a real ownership does not exist, but where a secret transfer
has been made to another." Allen v. Massey, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 351, 354 (1872).
17. See 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 16, § 348. If GMAC did come within the
protection of section 26 of the Sales Act, then the transaction in question
would seem to fall within its condemnation. Where the seller retains posses-
sion of an automobile, except for a few hours when the buyer was using it,
there is not such a delivery of possession as will prevent a levy by the seller's
creditors. Horten v. Colonial Finance Corp., 90 Pa. Super. 460 (1927).
18. UNNuoim TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1007 (1956).




liberty of sale, including one who takes by conditional sale or under a
pre-existing mercantile contract with the trustee to buy the goods de-
livered, or like goods, for cash or on credit. °2 0 It is to be observed that
this Act expressly protects a buyer in a purchase in due course on
credit against the doctrine that a price as yet unpaid is not value.
2 '
In the case at hand the court thought that in order to sustain com-
plainant's claim as a bona fide purchaser, it was necessary for him to
allege and prove that he had no notice of GMAC's right not only
at the time of his purchase of the car, but also at the time of his
actual payment of the consideration for it. The court then concluded
that if it could be said that complainant proved the first of these
requisites, it certainly cannot be said that he proved the second; for if,
after receiving notice of GMAC's claim he could then have stopped
payment of his check, he was not a bona fide purchaser. If the court
believed complainant, then it appears that he had given value before
he received actual notice of GMAC's clain to the automobile. Since
the purchase of goods on credit constitutes value within the purview
of the applicable section of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, it seems
plausible to contend that complainant gave value when he made the
contract of sale, applied a $600 credit he had with dealer on the trans-
action,22 and gave his personal check for the balance. The giving of
a negotiable instrument constitutes giving value within the purview of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, on the theory that it is possible for
the instrument to get into the hands of a holder in due course.23 In
particular it seems that complainant gave value up to $600. Ostensibly,
the court felt that complainant had actual knowledge of GMAC's
security interest in the automobile at the time he made the contract
of purchase with the dealer, and they could have so held. That would
have defeated complainant's claim that he was a purchaser in the
ordinary course of trade. The point of time when value actually is
given could be become quite crucial in another case.
Right of Finance Company to Assert Lien on Unidentified Receipts
from Sale of Auto by Bankrupt Dealer: In Re Harpeth Motors24 in-
volves the impact of the Bankruptcy Act on the trust receipt. Specif-
ically this case called into question the rights of the entruster (C.I.T.
Credit Corporation) to proceeds from cars which the trustee (dealer)
had sold without remitting to the entruster. This was a bankruptcy
20. UNIFomV TRUSTS RECEIPTS ACT § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1002 (1956).
21. UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 9(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1010(3)
(1956).
22. Ibid. Part of the value consisted of credit for a sum realized from sale
of a previous automobile in Colonial Finance Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn.
626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939).
23. Pennoyer v. Dubois State Bank, 35 Wyo. 319, 249 Pac. 795 (1926); see
BUTTON, BILs AND NOTES § 98 (1943).
24. 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
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case in which the entruster insisted that it possessed priority by way
of a lien over general creditors with respect to proceeds from seven
motor vehicles which entruster had placed in the hands of the bank-
rupt-dealer for sale under duly executed trust receipts. The vehicles
had been sold before bankruptcy and the proceeds therefrom could
not be identified nor traced. Nevertheless the entruster asserted a prior
secured claim against the bankrupt's assets to the extent of these
proceeds. Credit Corporation's claim was resisted as a state created
priority, which would be invalid under the Bankruptcy Act.
It was conceded that the transactions between the Credit Corpora-
tion and the bankrupt with respect to the seven vehicles were trust
receipt transactions within the meaning of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, and that the Credit Corporation as the entruster held duly
executed trust receipts covering each of the motor vehicles. More-
over, more than four months prior to the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, Credit Corporatiorf had duly filed with the Secretary of State
in Tennessee, in conformity with the Act, the requisite "Statement
of Trust Receipt Financing." Admittedly the seven vehicles were sold
by bankrupt in the ordinary course of trade, and the proceeds from
the sales were received by the bankrupt although they could not be
identified among its assets.
The pivotal point of the case is whether section 10 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act2 creates a lien upon the dealer's (trustee) assets
to secure payment of the Credit Corporation's (entruster) claim for
the value of unidentifiable proceeds. So far as is pertinent, section
10 provides:
[T]he entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against
all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the
time of disposition by the trustee, as follows ... (b) to any proceeds or
the value of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not)
of the goods, documents or instruments, if said proceeds were received
by the trustee within ten (10) days prior to either application for ap-
pointment of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or
demand by the entruster for prompt accounting, and to a priority to the
amount of such proceeds or value ....
The federal district court held that section 10 of the Act created
a lien upon trustee's (dealer) assets to secure payment of the value
of the proceeds from the sale although the proceeds could not be
identified nor traced. Consequently, Credit Corporation was given
a preferred position over general creditors by reason of its lien
security. 6 This preferential treatment would not have been allowed
25. TENr. CODE ANN. § 47-1011 (1956).
26. Credit Corporation's security claim was disallowed as to certain of the
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had Credit Corporation's claim been considered a state created priority
in the distribution of dealer's assets, which the court pointed out. The
Bankruptcy Act (section 67(c)) does respect and preserve certain
state created liens, although they result in giving the lien creditor a
preferred status with respect to general creditors of the bankrupt.27
In the Harpeth Motors case the court apparently is breaking new
ground. No other case on this point has been found, and this opinion
is an excellent one in support of the conclusion that the priority given
the entruster over general creditors is a lien. However, before con-
cluding that the entruster's position as a preferred lien creditor is
impregnable, there is another stile that must be crossed. In 1952
Congress made a major overhaul of section 67 (c) of the Bankruptcy
Act, which governs the position given by the Act to state liens.
Section 67 (c) (1) now provides that if a statutory lien is asserted
against personal property for taxes or debts, and if the lien has not been
enforced by sale before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and if the
lien is not accompanied by possession, it is subordinated to priority
claims for administrative expenses and wages32 But much more sweep-
ing in its condemnatory terms is section 67 (c) (2) 29 by which Congress
endeavored to invalidate as against the trustee in bankruptcy, so-called
statutory "liens" which amounted merely to state priorities relabeled
"liens."30 This last provision of the Bankruptcy Act invalidates as
against the trustee in bankruptcy statutory liens for debts owing
to any person created or recognized by state law, on personal property
not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint.31
The question immediately arises whether Credit Corporation's lien
given by virtue of the trust receipts statute is a "statutory lien" within
the invalidating provisions of section 67 (c) (2) of the Bankruptcy
Act.
vehicles because there had not been a timely demand for an accounting as
required by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
27. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b) (1953).
28. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (1953). This
section, as amended by the Act of 1952, provides in part: "Where not en-
forced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under
this title, and except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent: (1) though
valid against the trustee under subdivision (b) of this section, statutory liens,
including liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to any State
or any subdivision thereof, on personal property not accompanied by pos-
session of such property, and liens, whether statutory or not, of distress
for rent shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses
(1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title .... "
29. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (1953).
30. See 4 CoLmER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.20(5) (14th ed., Supp. 1955).
31. "(2) the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section to the contrary
notwithstanding, statutory liens created or recognized by the laws of any
State for debts owing to any person, including any State or any subdivision
thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of, or by levy
upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such property, shall not be valid
against the trustee . . . ." 66 STAT. 428 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (1953).
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No case law expressly passing on this issue has been found. Ap-
parently the point was not raised in Harpeth Motors, although by
implication the court would seem to decide that Credit Corporation's
lien is not of the "statutory" variety condemned by the Bankruptcy
Act. Unfortunately, the leading authorities in the field are divided on
the question whether the lien arising under a trust receipt is within
the purview of "statutory hens." The editors of Collier on Bankruptcy
express the view that the lien of a trust receipt is contractual rather
than statutory, even though without the statute the agreement of the
parties would not effectively create a lien under nonbankruptcy law.32
Professor Hanna, on the other hand, suggests that the trust receipts
lien may be considered "statutory.
233
It would have been most helpful for the court to have made an
express holding on this point in Harpeth Motors.
Prior to the 1950 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act3 4 with respect
to preferences, the trust receipt security device was open to attack
by the trustee in bankruptcy on the ground that it constituted a
preference within the purview of section 60 (a) of that Act.35 Since that




The rights of the Trustee in Bankruptcy under a trust receipt exe-
cuted by a bankrupt automobile dealer have been treated in the
immediately preceding discussion.
Dischargeability of Judgment for Bankrupt's Liability for Per-
sonal Injuries Caused by Reckless Driving: The recurring question
of when an automobile accident claim is barred by a bankruptcy
discharge was presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hender-
son v. Freshour.37 While a discharge in bankruptcy is a defense
to certain kinds of liabilities of the bankrupt, it has no effect upon
others. One of the types of claims against the bankrupt that is not
dischargeable is that of a willful and malicious injury to the person
or property of another.38 In the Henderson case the court was faced
32. 4 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.20(2) (14th ed., Supp. 1955).
33. Hanna, Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and Section 67b of the
Bankruptcy Law, 25 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1950).
34. 64 STAT. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96 (Supp. 1955).
35. In re Harvey Distributing Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950).
36. Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951).
37. 287 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1956).
38. The discharge releases the bankrupt from all of his provable debts
which were duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance or which were
held by creditors with notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C.A. § 32 (1953), authorizes a general discharge, while section 17(a) of
the Act, 30 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1953), expressly
reserves from the operation of the discharge debts not affected by the dis-
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with the question whether a judgment for injuries sustained in an
automobile collision was discharged by the bankruptcy of the tort
feasor. The declaration in the tort action had alleged that the defendant
(bankrupt), while driving his automobile at an excessive rate of speed
and under the influence of intoxicants, ran a red light and struck the
car in which plaintiff-claimant was riding. The declaration further
charged that the negligence of the defendant "was so gross as to con-
stitute a wanton and willful disregard" of plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff
asked for and was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding
that the allegations of the declaration and the proof showed a willful
and malicious injury to plaintiff's person; hence the judgment was
not discharged by defendant's subsequent bankruptcy. As the court
quite properly points out, the question of whether a judgment is
dischargeable by bankruptcy must be decided from the record in the
case in which the judgment was obtained.39
Prior to the Henderson case, Tennessee seemed committed to the
view that a claim based on the negligence of the bankrupt-motorist-
even gross negligence--does not constitute such a willful and malicious
injury as to be nondischargeable. 40 The Seward case,41 cited in the
Henderson opinion, ostensibly further committed Tennessee to a very
liberal stand toward the bankrupt-motorist. The Seward judgment was
based on a declaration that alleged that the bankrupt "willfully,"
"wantonly," "recklessly," and "deliberately" drove his automobile to
the left of the center of the highway and crashed headlong into
plaintiff-claimant, while defendant was under the influence of in-
toxicants. Based on his declaration, the Seward claimant was awarded
both punitive and compensatory damages. Nevertheless, the court
was not satisfied that the injury was willful and malicious; and hence
the claim was declared to be barred by the bankruptcy discharge.
No doubt the striking similarity of the Seward record and the Hen-
charge and lists several kinds of claims that are not barred by the discharge.
Among the claims not discharged are those for willful and malicious in-
juries to persons and property. For a much more extensive discussion of
claims barred by bankruptcy discharge, with particular emphasis on automo-
bile accident claims and unscheduled claims, see Hartman, Creditors' Rights
-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (1953). An abbreviated
treatment of the various facets of the dischargeability of automobile accident
claims is given in the present discussion because of this extended earlier
discussion of the pertinent aspects of the subject.
39. See, e.g., 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17 (14th ed. 1940); 8 REaMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY 196 (6th ed. 1955). For a recent case adopting this view, see In re
Carncross, 114 F. Supp. 119 (W.D.N.Y. 1953), criticized in 11 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 176 (1954).
40. See Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952); Marbry V.
'Cain, 180 Tenn. 500, 176 S.W.2d 813 (1944); 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17
(14th ed. 1940).
41. Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952).
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derson record is apparent, although the results of the two cases are
diametrically opposite. In the writer's opinion, the Henderson case
saps the vitality of the Seward rationale.42 In so doing, the court
reaches a result that not only is in line with much respectable author-
ity denying a discharge where the bankrupt-motorist is guilty of
recklessness, 43 but also a result that is more consonant with the pur-
pose and objectives of the discharge feature of the Bankruptcy Act.44
The Henderson decision serves an urgent public need for protection
against the increasingly alarming menace of recklessness on the
highways.
45
A good many states have found a partially effective way to prevent
negligent drivers from obtaining financial safety through a bankruptcy
discharge. Statutes have been enacted giving authority to revoke
driving permits until tort judgments are paid, and providing that a
discharge in bankruptcy shall not relieve the judgment debtor from
the revocation. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld
such a statute providing for the suspension of the license of the opera-
tor of an automobile because of an unsatisfied judgment against the
operator arising from motor car operation by a discharged bankrupt,
even though the bankruptcy petition was filed after the judgment.40
The statute was sustained over the objection that it was in contra-
vention of the Bankruptcy Act. States may now revoke driving per-
mits until tort judgments are paid, without fear of such laws being
struck down as a contravention of the Bankruptcy Act.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Right of Chattel Mortgagee to Take Possession of Article Covered
42. The Seward case was criticized in Hartman, Creditor's Rights-1953
Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1059-60 (1953), which suggested that
the court might well have followed the reasoning and approach now employed
in the Henderson case.
43. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); In re Greene, 87
F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937); In re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.2d 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1928); Fitz-
gerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P.2d 364 (1947); Tharp v. Breito-
wich, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 801 (1945);
Reell v. Central Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500 (1942);
Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950); McClure v. Steele, 326
Mich. 286, 40 N.W.2d 153 (1949); Wegiel v. Hogan, 28 N.J. Super. 144, 100
A.2d 349 (1953); Greenfield v. Tucillo, 265 App. Div. 343, 38 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st
Dep't 1942); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594 (1948); Saueressig v.
Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.2d 417 (1944).
44. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, as stated by the most authoritive
tribunal on the subject, is "to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obliga-
tions and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes." Williams v.
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). It seems pertinent
to inquire, as did a Louisiana court, whether the Bankruptcy Act was ever
intended to shield drunken, speed maniacs from the consequences of their
indifference and utter disregard for the safety of others. Rosen v. Shingleur,
47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950).
45. 11 WASH. & LE L. Rv. 176 (1954).
46. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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by Mortgage, Sell at Non-Judicial Sale, and Take Deficiency Judg-
ment: The Tennessee Supreme Court had before it the problem of the
right of a chattel mortgagee to repossess the mortgaged property,
sell it, and then take a deficiency judgment in the case of Third Nat'l
Bank v. Olive.47 In placing a chattel mortgage on his trailer truck
refrigerator unit, the mortgagor agreed in the mortgage document
to permit the mortgagee to take possession of the chattel without
legal process should the mortgagor default on his obligation. The docu-
,ment further authorized the mortgagee to sell at public or private sale.
There was a default; the mortgagee did take possession without further
consent of the mortgagor and without legal process; there was a non-
judicial foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged chattel; and the mort-
gagee sued the mortgagor for the deficiency. The court of appeals
reversed a trial court judgment for the plaintiff and gave judgment
for the defendant-mortgagor on the ground that the chattel mortgagor
could not, prior to a default by him, waive or consent to the mort-
gagee's taking possession of the property in case of default. In reversing
the court of appeals and affirming the trial court deficiency judgment
for the plaintiff-mortgagee, the Supreme Court thought that the court
of appeals erroneously applied the doctrines of conditional sales to
chattel mortgages in holding that the taking of possession of the trailer
and sale were void. The Supreme Court thought that the conditional
sale and chattel mortgage were so basically different that different
rules applied to the chattel mortgage. A Tennessee statute regulates
the foreclosure of conditional sales,48 but there is no such statute appli-
cable to chattel mortgages. Hence, the parties forge their own terms,
by contract, relative to the foreclosure of chattel mortgages.
Actually, there does not appear to be anything in the Tennessee
statute relating the foreclosure of conditional sales which says that
the conditional buyer cannot validly consent in advance (in the con-
ditional sales agreement) to the vendor's taking of possession in the
event the buyer defaults. In fact, the court of appeals has held that
the buyer can validly consent in advance.
49
The Supreme Court seems to have concluded properly that where the
chattel mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property in an
orderly manner without a breach of the peace, he may do so without
legal process and without any further consent of the chattel mortgagor,
who gave his consent in the case at hand in the mortgage instrument.50
47. 281 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1955).
48. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1301 to -1313 (1956). For a discussion and com-
parison of the conditional sale and the chattel mortgage in Tennessee, see
Comment, 22 TENN. L. REV. 392, 402-07 (1952).
49. Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co., 16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (E.S.
1932).




Likewise, the mortgagee has power to foreclose through a non-judi-
cial sale.51 Apparently there must be reasonable notice of the time
and place of sale both to the debtor-mortgagor and to the public. 5 2
Although the agreement in the case at hand authorized the mortgagee
to sell at a private sale without notice, the validity of that provision
of the agreement was not before the court. Apparently, the mortgagee
may sell at a private sale only where the mortgage gives the right to
sell at public or private sale.5 3
The doctrine that the mortgagee in a real estate mortgage is for-
bidden to clog the mortgagor's equity of redemption seems to have
little application, if any, in the field of chattel mortgages in Tennes-
see.
Effect of Failure to Specify Mortgaged Crops in the Instrument
Where Farm Lies in Two Counties: "A mortgage is void as to property
not described therein. . . ."54 In Dyersburg Production Credit Ass'n v.
McGuire5 5 the Tennessee Court of Appeals was of the opinion that
where the mortgagor's farm was in Dyer and Obion Counties and the
chattel mortgage covered crops in Dyer County only, the mortgagee
could not subject crops in Obion County to his mortgage. In this case
the chattel mortgagee sued the mortgagor and two other defendants
for the value of cotton and soy beans grown in Obion County al-
legedly covered by complainant-mortgagee's chattel mortgage. These
products had been sold by the mortgagor to the other defendants. In
deciding the case for the defendants, the court held that the evidence
was not sufficient to establish that complainant's mortgage covered
the crops in question. Complainant had further contended that the
defendant-purchaser was familiar with the entire farm of the mort-
gagor and that was sufficient to warrant a holding that the mortgage
did cover the crops in question. Of course, that argument carries no
weight once the court had decided that the mortgage did not cover
any crops in Obion County. As Jones puts it: "A mortgage is void as to
property not described therein."56 Extrinsic evidence may be used to
identify a chattel covered by a chattel mortgage, but that evidence
cannot be used to contradict or add to the written document.57 Ex-
51. 1 DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 474-75 (1951); 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note
50, § 705.
52. 1 DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 474 (1951); 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 50,
§ 708.
53. 1 DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 474-75 (1951); 2 JONES, op. Cit. supra note
50, § 793.
54. 1 JONES, op. cit. supra note 50, § 55 (6th ed. 1933, Supp. 1951).
55. 289 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
56. See note 54 supra. A mortgage of all the cotton to be raised on a certain
field described, does not include cotton grown on another field, even though
that is the only cotton on the farm. Darr v. Kempe, 54 Ark. 91, 15 S.W. 14
(1891).
57. 1 JONES, op. cit. supra note 54, § 54.
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trinsic evidence that would bring the crops in Obion within the scope
of the mortgage coverage would add to the written document.
MATERIALMEN'S Lns
Liens on Railroad Property for Rental of Machinery, and Repairs
to the Machinery Used in Improving Railroad Property: In Harris v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry.58 the Supreme Court of Tennessee was
concerned with the scope of the statutory lien of subcontractors,
laborers and materialmen against railroads. A Tennessee statute
authorizes a lien on the railroad's property in favor of "Every sub-
contractor, laborer, materialman, or other person" for claims resulting
from work and labor done, or material furnished, or services rendered
with reference to such property.59 The claim consisted of (1) rental
of heavy earth-moving equipment used in making improvements on
the railroad; and (2) repairs and replacements of parts and machinery
used in the performance of the work. In affirming the chancellor,
the Supreme Court held that the statute authorized a lien for the
claim arising from the rental of the machinery which was used on the
railroad construction. However, the claim for repairs and replacement
of parts and machinery was not allowed to come within the scope of
the lien statute. The gist of the reasoning of the court seems to be that
the "use" of the dirt moving equipment-was purchased and consumed
in the repair of the railroad; hence the lien for the rental of the equip-
ment was proper. But the dirt removing equipment itself was not
purchased for use on the railroad; it remained the property of the
contractor to be used by him elsewhere in other work; hence the
repairs to that equipment were not materials or services rendered with
reference to the railroad, and consequently did not come within the
purview of the lien statute.
58. 280 S.W.2d 800 (1955).
59. TENN. CODE AwN. § 65-1011 (1956).
